

Question 1

Explain how the discrete-log problem provides security for the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.

Question 2

In this problem, we will construct a **zero-knowledge proof** system based on the discrete logarithm problem! A zero-knowledge proof system aims to have Alice (prover) convince Bob (verifier) that she *knows* a specific value, without Bob learning of the value himself.

In this case, Alice wants to prove to Bob she knows the **discrete log** of $y = g^x \pmod p$, e.g. she knows x in this expression, whereas Bob only knows g, p, y .

First, Alice computes a random number r and sends Bob $C = g^r \pmod p$. Bob then flips a coin and asks for either the value of r , or the value of $x + r \pmod{p-1}$.

If Bob requests the value of r , he verifies that the published value of C is truly equal to $g^r \pmod p$. If he asked for $x + r \pmod{p-1}$, he verifies that

$$\begin{aligned} g^{x+r \pmod{p-1}} \pmod p & \\ & \equiv g^x \cdot g^r \pmod p \\ & \equiv y \cdot C \pmod p \end{aligned}$$

The $\pmod{p-1}$ in the exponent preserves the confidentiality of x when added to a truly random r , much like a one-time pad.

1. Argue why Alice can satisfy either of Bob's requests if she truly knows x .
2. Show how Alice can **cheat** if she knows Bob will request the value of r . That is, show how Alice would construct a response to Bob that will be verified as correct, despite not knowing the value of x .
3. Show how Alice can **cheat** if she knows Bob will request the value of $x + r \pmod{p-1}$.
4. Explain why Alice can only succeed in convincing Bob with probability $\frac{1}{2}$ + some negligible value if she does not know x .

Why is this important? Since each round provides a 0.5 probability of cheating, we would chain together n rounds to get a probability of 2^{-n} that Alice is cheating.

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