

Question 1

Explain why unhashed (AKA textbook, simple) RSA signatures are vulnerable to existential forgery attacks.

Question 2

Recall the Digital Signature Algorithm from lecture with private key x , public key $y = g^x \pmod p$, where p, q are primes such that $p = aq + 1$ for some integer a . To sign, calculate (s_1, s_2) using a randomly chosen $k \pmod q$, where

$$\begin{aligned} S_1 &= (g^k \pmod p) \pmod q \\ S_2 &= k^{-1}(H(M) + xS_1) \pmod q \end{aligned}$$

Define $V_1 \equiv H(M)S_2^{-1} \pmod q$ and $V_2 \equiv S_1S_2^{-1} \pmod q$. Verification is as follows: check that $(g^{V_1}y^{V_2} \pmod p) \pmod q = S_1$.

1. Prove the correctness of DSA, i.e. prove that a valid signature will always pass verification.
2. Explain how an attacker is able to detect when two different signatures use the same ephemeral signing key k , regardless of the message.

HINT: Take a look at the equation for S_1

3. Show how an attacker can recover k given access to two different DSA signatures S, S' using the same k .

HINT: Consider the expression $S_2 - S'_2$

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